Rank, Income and Income Inequality in Urban China by Gustafsson, Björn & Sai, Ding
IZA DP No. 3843



























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
November 2008 





University of Gothenburg 
and IZA  
 
Ding Sai 











P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 










Rank, Income and Income Inequality in Urban China
*
 
While some workers in China attain senior professional level and senior cadre level status 
(Chuzhang and above), others attain middle rank including middle rank of professional and 
cadre (Kezhang). This aspect of the Chinese labor force has attracted surprisingly little 
attention in the literature, a fact which this paper aims to rectify. We define various segments 
of the urban population in work-active ages and use data from the Chinese Income Project 
(CHIP) covering eastern, central and western China for 1995 and 2002. For 2002, persons of 
high rank make up 3 percent and persons of middle rank make up 14 percent of persons in 
work-active ages. Factors that affect a person’s likelihood of having high or middle rank are 
investigated by estimating a multinomial probit model. We find that education, age and 
gender strongly affect the probability of being employed as a worker of high rank. There is 
relatively little income inequality among workers of high rank as well as among workers of 
middle rank. Mean income and household wealth per capita of highly-ranked workers 
developed more favorably than for other segments of the population studied, and personal 
income is more polarized by segment in 2002 than in 1995. Workers of high rank, and to a 
lesser degree, workers of middle rank, are among the winners in economic terms while the 
increasingly large category of non-workers are the losers. Rates of return to education have 
increased but income function analysis indicates that this provides only a partial explanation 
for the increased favorable income situation for workers of high and middle ranks. 
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In the 1950s when China adopted a Soviet type of economic system, labor was centrally 
allocated within the cities. Workers typically had lifelong relations with the work unit where 
they originally started after having finished school. Wages were paid according to centrally 
determined wage scales in a system where workers were also compensated with in-kind 
payments, heavily subsidized housing, access to social services and social insurance benefits. 
At any given work unit, workers were categorized by rank in a system (Zhiwu Zhicheng Xilie) 
that perhaps most easily can be understood by likening it to how armed forces are organized. 
That is, there are various hierarchical levels that are based on occupation but also to some 
extent on personal characteristics. Many responsibilities signify a position of high rank. The 
procedures for obtaining a higher rank were well-known, and therefore it was (and still is) 
possible for the individual to plan a career. More highly-ranked workers received better 
remuneration than workers ranked lower. The highest-ranked workers were the economic elite.       
 
Since the 1980s, urban China has undergone large changes in most aspects of economic life. 
Notably, new forms of ownership have multiplied. Thus men and women who work in 
foreign-invested companies, are self-employed, or work in private or collective enterprises, are 
not covered by the ranking system and new economic elites have emerged. Just as important as 
the rank system covering fewer persons is that employment rates have fallen from their earlier 
very high levels. This is mainly due to structural changes during the second part of the 1990s 
when work units laid off workers on a large scale, resulting in a shrinking labor force and 
increased unemployment. Nonetheless, the system of rank has survived and continues to cover 
many workers. What has happened to the former economic elite? Has the economic situation of 
high-ranking workers deteriorated? Or have high-ranking workers retained their numbers and 
managed to “surf on the waves of change”? Given that many consider rank an important aspect 
of the job, and that it ensures higher remuneration and well-being, the answers to these 
questions are clearly of interest.   
 
The issue of how elites have fared during the transition from planned to market economy has 
attracted much interest in the sociological literature. As early as 1989 Victor Nee published a 
paper proposing a general theory for societies in transition (Nee, 1989). It was based on a study 
of income for cadre and other households in rural China collected in 1984. According to Nee, 
the introduction and expansion of market institutions give rise to multiple bases of power, 
  2privilege, and change in the structure of opportunity and incentive. Further, human capital 
provides more income benefits, while the influence of political capital vanishes.   
 
Claiming to be a general theory, the original paper of Nee has stimulated theoretical 
developments such as Walder (2003) as well as many studies of income among elites in 
countries in transition. Several studies have addressed the issue of remuneration of elites in 
urban China during transition, see for example Walder (1995), Bian and Logan (1996) and more 
recently Bian and Zhang (2004) as well as Chao and Nee (2005). While these studies do not 
explicitly focus on the workers’ rank, studies that have used some thousand life histories 
collected in twenty cities in 1993 and 1994 do (see Zhou, Tuma and Moen 1997, Zhou    and Ho 
1999, Walder, Li and Treiman 2000, Zhou 2000 and, building on most of them, Zhou 2004). 
These studies analyse entry into elite occupations, promotion in the rank system as well as the 
role of rank in income determination. They also investigate to what extent various cohorts of 
workers  have  fared  differently.     
 
Our aims for this paper are twofold. First we wish to better understand what makes some people 
more likely than others to possess high and middle-high rank, respectively. To what extent do 
education, age and gender play a role and are there intergenerational influences? Is rank status 
influenced by people’s forced migration experience during the Cultural Revolution or from 
experiencing rural to urban migration? The second aim is to describe and analyse the 
development of personal income among people of high, middle and low ranks. In particular we 
are interested in whether or not the income advantage of being a high- or middle-ranked worker 
has changed, and whether a person’s rank has an independent effect on personal money income 
when personal characteristics such as education, age and location are considered. This means 
that our aims resemble those of the sociological studies that have analyzed life histories to 
understand elite recruitment and how elite status affects income. Like these studies, we use data 
covering large parts of urban China. However, this study differs in several aspects from the 
sociological studies referred to above. First, we define labor market segments differently. 
Second, we apply another modeling strategy when analyzing the process of having elite status 
and to some extent also when analyzing income determination. Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, we study a more recent period; in addition to analyzing data for 1995 we also use 
data from 2002. Between these two years, State Owned Enterprises were put under heavy 
market pressure due to enterprise reform. This led to restructuring and layoffs and reform 
  3resulted in many workers in SOEs no longer being covered by the ranking system.
2 At the onset 
it can also be useful to make clear that while this paper attempts to provide new knowledge on 
the fate of the old economic elite, it does not address issues of recruitment and income situation 
of the new economic elite made up of entrepreneurs, private owners and top- and 
middle-management in the sectors not covered by the rank system.   
 
We find that education and age positively affect the probability of achieving the rank of high 
and middle status. We also find that being male strongly affects the probability of having a high 
rank. The probability for reaching the rank of high or middle increases if the worker has 
migrated from rural China and is a member of CPC, while the opposite is true for a worker who 
was sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution.     
 
Turning to the second research question we find that personal income within the categories 
workers of high rank and workers of middle rank is relatively equally distributed and has 
developed more favorably than for other segments. The workers of high rank and to a lesser 
degree those of middle rank, are among the winners in China’s transition towards a market 
economy, as their personal income, disposable household per capita income, household wealth 
and housing per capita increased more rapidly than for most other categories. In contrast, the 
losers are made up of a larger and larger group of non-workers. In 2002, personal income in 
urban China is more polarized by labour market segment than in 1995.     
 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: In the next section we discuss the context with 
emphasis on how workers are ranked, while the database for the study is presented in Section 3. 
In Section 4 we define the categories under study, report their relative numbers and provide 
basic information on their characteristics. The analysis of what affects people’s labor market 
segment is addressed in Section 5. In Section 6, income among people belonging to different 





                                                           
2 There are also differences in how data was collected. The data the sociologists analyzed was collected at one point in time using many 
retrospective questions, while we use repeated cross sections.    Our data covers 89 cities, while the data analyzed by the sociologists is 
from 20 cities and oversamples larger cities. We analyze yearly income, while the sociologists had access to monthly income.         
  42. Context   
 
The ranking system (Zhiwu Zhicheng Xilie) was taken from the Soviet Union to China for its 
national government departments, institutions and state-owned enterprises. A rank was (and still 
is) important for the level of wages, but in many cases is even more important for obtaining 
subsidized housing and for being entitled to welfare benefits such as    health care at a low or no 
cost. A person’s rank was and is also central for a career and for pension size when retiring 
from work.     
 
The rank system establishes a hierarchy with many levels. 
3    For example, in the governmental 
sphere there are fifteen grades with the Prime Minister having the highest, vice ministers belong 
to the fourth and fifth grades, and county leaders grades seven to ten.    In short: The majority of 
workers have no rank, some are of middle rank and only a few have a high rank. The proportion 
of workers being high or middle rank varied across work units.   
 
Looking more closely one can find that the system consists of two parts. One is applied only for 
workers with cadre status and is called the post-appointment system (Zhiwu Xilie). The other is 
for professional and technical workers and is called the professional, technical title system 
(Zhicheng Xilie). In our view, remuneration, housing and health care benefits are rather similar 
and these two parts can be considered as one system for our research questions.
4 This view is 
supported by the fact that a worker can have a rank in both sub-systems.
5 Increasingly, there is a 
tendency for larger numbers of persons to have a rank not only in the professional title system 
but also in the post appointment system. Being ranked in two systems rather than one can be 
advantageous for the worker as he or she can receive higher wages, for example.     
 
Different channels for gaining the status of state cadre have existed. During the planning epoch 
if persons graduated from a college or another form of higher education they were certain of 
being allocated a job by the government and attaining state cadre status. More recently the 
labour market perform this function, but with uncertainty for the individual. A second channel 
                                                           
3 See Tang    (2006), Luo and Lu (2005) as well as Zhagn and Yuan (2007).   
4 For another view see Walder, Li and Treiman (2000). In our data for 2002 average personal income for low-rank cadre is only 5 percent 
higher than for low-rank professional. The corresponding differences were among middle rank 6 percent and among high rank only 2 
p e r c e n t .       
5 For example if a person performs professional work and is promoted to the head of an institution, he or she might not only belong to 
Zhicheng Xilie but also to Zhiwu Xilie. It means that a person could be Chuzhang (senior cadre level) and have a high professional title. 
Similarly, if a person is an official and performs professional work, he or she could be in both systems.   
 
  5applies to people with lower levels of education. In time, and with a good work record, they 
could be promoted to state cadre status. Thus rank position depended not only on education, but 
also on perceived qualifications. A third channel applied to army cadres who left their duties 
and thereby were placed into a rank position.     
 
If persons wish to increase their rank in the technical title system or the post appointment 
system, they must qualify. Each of the systems has its own standards for improving a worker’s 
rank level. To give an example, if a low-rank person wishes to become middle rank, or a 
middle-rank person wishes to be promoted to high rank, the person must have the required work 
experience.  
 
During the reform era the ranking system has changed. With the development of the 
State-owned Enterprises’ reform, the ranking system was phased out from the state owned 
enterprises, a process that had not fully ended when our data for 2002 was collected. However, 
this dramatic change has not meant a dismantling of the ranking system. Instead, a new process 
of qualification examinations has been created. Outsiders might perceive this as a reinstatement 
of the imperial examination system though in a modernized form, while many insiders are 
sympathetic as it can make the process of improving  one’s  rank  less  arbitrary.     
 
There are several large categories of China’s Zhicheng (professional, technical title system) 
examinations for people working in fields such as economics, accounting, engineering, law and 
judiciary, health and sanitation, IT,  foreign languages, etc. Each of these categories has its 
own specific examinations. For example, there are nine kinds of examinations for accountants. 
The examinations take place once a year on a given date all over China. They are composed of 
a written part, which is identical for all applications, and in several cases also an oral part. To 
take part in the examination an applicant must receive approval from his or her superior and 
must register. If the examination is passed, the worker receives the relevant professional title.       
 
3. Data   
 
This study uses two large surveys of urban residents conducted in the spring of 1996 and 2003, 
respectively, for the reference years 1995 and 2002. The survey instruments were designed by 
the researchers of the China Income Distribution Project (CHIP), a group of researchers at the 
Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing and scholars from other 
  6countries. The project was assisted by the Team of Urban Surveys at the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) that conducted the fieldwork.     
 
The survey was obtained from larger samples used by NBS to produce official statistics for 
China. Much of the policy making in China is directed to specific regions; the eastern, central 
and western regions. Economic reform was first introduced in the eastern regions, while more 
recent policymaking has been directed to the western region, which has lagged behind the 
others in development. At a first stage of selecting the sample, the municipality of Beijing and 
the provinces of Liaoning, Jiangsu and Guangdong were chosen to represent the eastern region, 
the provinces Shanxi, Anhui, Henan and Hubei to represent the central region, and the 
municipality of Chongqing and the provinces of Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan to represent the 
western region.   
 
From these provinces a sample of 6 934 households living in 69 cities was obtained for 1995 
and a sample of 6 835 households living in 70 cities for 2002. The sample frame for the urban 
sample is based on registers of people possessing a hukou. Thus it does not cover rural migrants 
living in urban China.
6 Comparability across the two surveys is high in many respects, though 
the information on personal background is richer in 2002. While several authors have used the 
survey to study earnings inequality and earnings determination among urban workers, they have 
not focused on workers’ rank, its determinants as well as income, as we do here.
7  
  
  4. Categories   
 
We study people aged 16 to 55 (female) and 16 to 60 (male), that is, the upper age limit is set at 
the age when most people have retired. Based on survey questions on occupation during most of 
the year, we define five labour-market segment categories. The residual category consists of 
non-workers (for example students, homemakers, early-retired, and unemployed). Some people 
in the residual category can have been employed some, but not all of, the year investigated. 
Within the category workers, some make their livelihood outside the sectors covered by the 
                                                           
6 For further information on the data see Li et al (2008).   
7 Earlier studies using the 1995 survey include Gustafsson and Li (2001) and Knight and Song (2003), both in connection with the survey 
from 1988. Appleton et al (2005) and Knight and Song (2008) are examples of studies which have estimated earnings functions using the 
1995 and 2002 surveys. Some authors have used the surveys to focus on gender-related issues, which include the following studies using 
the 1988 and 1995 surveys, Gustafsson and Li (2000), Bishop et all. (2005) and Démuger and Fournier    (2007); and the following using 
the 1995 survey in combination with the 2002 survey: Braunstein and Brenner (2007) and Li and Gustafsson (2008).   
 
  7rank system. We divide such workers into workers in the non-covered sector (“Non-covered 
workers” for short) and the much smaller category self-employed, which includes private 
owners (“self-employed” for short).  Workers in work units where the rank system is applied 
are divided into three categories: High-rank workers include those who have senior professional 
level and senior cadre level (Chuzhang) and higher. This means that this category includes a 
typical head of a county and persons with higher rank in the administrative system such as 
professors at research institutes. Middle-rank workers include the middle rank of professional 
and cadre (Kezhang) levels. Typical examples are teachers at secondary schools and engineers. 
Workers in the covered sector not belonging to either of these two categories are categorized as 
low-rank workers.   
 
/Table 1 about here/   
 
Table 1 reports sample sizes and the relative size of the six categories for 1995 and 2002. Some 
changes across years are large. Not surprisingly, the proportion of low-rank workers has 
decreased. Actually, the proportion has more than halved, that is from 38 percent of the 
population in 1995 to only 16 percent in 2002. In contrast, the proportion of non-workers 
increased from as low as 5 percent in 1995 to as high as 28 percent in 2002.
 8  There  is  also  an 
increase in the self-employment category (up to 3 percent), while the proportion of workers in 
the non-covered sector remained more or less unchanged (the proportion went from 36 to 37 
percent). High-rank workers made up 3 percent of people in work-active ages in 2002 while 
middle-rank persons accounted for 13 percent. These percentages are only slightly lower than in 
1995. Thus, as evaluated by their numbers, the categories of high-ranked workers and 
middle-ranked workers have remained relatively unchanged during this period of transition. 
High-ranked workers have thus become a much larger proportion of all ranked workers, a 
change most probably due to a lesser risk of being laid off. 
 
/Table 2 about here/   
 
In Table 2 we learn that the six categories differ along several characteristics. Particularly 
striking is that high-rank workers are the longest educated and the oldest. For example, in 2002 
high-rank workers were on average almost seven years older than low-ranked workers, and they 
                                                           
8 The composition of non-workers was in 1995 /2002: Early-retired    62 / 31 percent, unemployed 13 / 28 percent, students 13 / 28 
percent, homemakers 5 / 8 percent and others 6 / 5 percent.       
  8had an average education that was 3.5 years longer; these differences were even larger in 1995. 
The age differences are due to age affecting promotion to higher rank, but also to a lesser extent 
due to higher-ranked workers exiting the labor force at higher ages than low-ranked workers.
9 
The table also shows that the shortest average education is found among the self-employed and 
among non-workers. High-ranked and middle-ranked workers are predominantly male and the 
dominance actually increased. As many as 81 percent of all high-rank workers were males in 
2002.  In contrast, women dominate among non-workers. There is also a large difference in 
membership in CPC across segments. Most striking is that while as few as 9 percent of 
self-employed individuals were members of CPC in 2002, the corresponding proportion among 
high-rank workers was as high as 68 percent.
10    
 
The existence of the Hukou system puts barriers on rural to urban migration. Despite this, a 
considerable portion of the urban workers are rural born. The numbers are highest for high-rank 
workers, where according to our sample for 2002, as many as one-third are rural born. Such 
over-representation is understandable, as one route for receiving an urban hukou is via a long 
education and another by becoming a cadre. (See for example Deng and Gustafsson, 2006) The 
information collected in the 2002 survey includes parental background and Table 2 shows some 
clear signs of intergenerational relations in labor market segments.   
 
 
5. Being a high- or middle-rank worker   
 
We concentrate the analysis of factors affecting people’s rank status to the 2002 survey which is 
richer in variables.
11 The statistical analysis consists of estimating a Multinomial Probit model 
with low-rank worker as the omitted category; see Table 3 where we report marginal effects. 
Explanatory variables include education, age, ethnic status, gender, and dummies for 
membership in CPC, for being sent down during the Cultural Revolution, and for being born in 
rural China. There are also three dummies for parental characteristics. There are substantial 
differences across urban China with respect to job opportunities that are preserved by the hukou 
                                                           
9 While the retirement for women in China is age 55, some high-rank women can continue to work after reaching this age. Also a few 
high-rank men can continue to work after the general retirement age of 60.       
10 Using data from CHIP 1985, 1995 (the same as here), and 1999, Appleton et al (2008) have studied the determinants of CPC 
membership, as well as its income consequences. They find that the following characteristics positively affect the probability of being a 
party member: male sex, experience (with declining force), education and being employed in the government sector.    Being employed in 
education has a negative coefficient.   
11 However, the survey does not contain information on each individual’s work history (event data). Thus we are not able to analyze for 
example the process of promotion from low to middle rank or from middle to high rank.   
  9system. Therefore we include one continuous variable measuring the employment rate in the 
city where the respondent resides and another measuring the city’s average per capita income 
(both are calculated from the data), as well as ten province dummies. In order to glean 
knowledge on changes over time, for 1995 as well as for 2002 we have used a specification 
containing only variables that are available for 1995. These results are shown in the Appendix.       
 
/Table 3 about here/   
 
As could be expected, education increases the probability of having a high rank as well as 
having a middle rank, with the largest influence on high rank. Conversely, education negatively 
affects the probability of being in sectors self-employed and a non-worker. Age positively and 
at a declining rate affects the probability of being a middle-rank worker, and particularly 
strongly affects the probability of being a high-rank worker.
12 CPC party membership positively 
affects the probability of having high and middle rank or working in the non-covered sector 
while negatively affects the probability of being in other states.
13  
 
Being male positive affects the probability of having high rank, and negatively affects the 
probability of being a worker in the non-covered sector or being a non-worker. Our analysis 
thus confirms the existence of some clear gender differences in the urban Chinese labour 
market. Keeping other characteristics constant, males are more likely to be high-rank workers 
and less likely to be working in the non-covered sector or to be non-employed. This reflects 
most likely not only the household’s, but also the work unit’s preferences and decisions which 
in turn can reinforce each other. In most countries it is more typical for males to specialize in 
market work, while females specialize in housework. While by international standards such 
divisions of labour within the household were small in pre-reform urban China, there are more 
recent signs of increased disparities. Since the mid-90s labor force participation rates among 
women approaching the general retirement age decreased more rapidly than among males (see 
Li  and  Gustafsson,  2008).       
 
In contrast to the influence of gender there is less evidence of ethnic minority status affecting 
                                                           
12 The age profile is actually steeper in 2002 than in 1995, see the Appendix. 
13 The specification reported in Table 3 assumes that causality runs from party membership to labor market status. It is interesting to see 
that if this is not accepted    and therefore    the model excluding the party member dummy is re-estimated, estimates for all other 
variables are surprisingly unchanged.     
  10work status.
14 More evidence of influence is found for the migration experience. If the person 
was sent down to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution, the probability of being low 
ranked is increased. One interpretation is that the experience of being sent down has locked the 
person into a low-rank job and made it difficult to advance within the work unit or to find 
earnings possibilities outside it. The reasons for such situations remain to be investigated, but 
one can speculate that being sent down entails long-lasting negative consequences on networks 
useful for job-promotion and effecting change.
15 Finally we report some (not strong) indicators 
of direct intergenerational linkages in labor market position. For example having a parent who 
is (or was) a cadre or professional increases the probability of being a high-rank worker.   
 
6.  Personal income: Average, inequality and determinants   
 
When analyzing income in this section, we concentrate on personal income. That is, we add 
income from various sources and use the individual as income receiving unit as well as analytic 
unit. Personal income does not include subsidies in kind such as access to subsidized housing or 
high quality health care at low or no cost, benefits that to a large extent were phased out during 
the period studied here. Starting in Table 4, we report means for the six categories defined in 
Section 4 for the two years under study.   
 
/Table  4  about  here/  
 
High-rank workers have the highest means and they are followed by middle-rank workers. Not 
surprisingly, non-workers have the lowest average personal incomes. Also of note is that the 
means changed rather differently from 1995 to 2002. While the average for all people in the 
studied group rose by 33 percent, average income for the heterogeneous category of 
non-workers fell by 24 percent. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the 
changes for the non-workers, it should be understood that the rapid expansion of the category 
was due not only to many middle-aged people being laid off, but also due to an ever larger 
proportion of young adults remaining in education (on the latter see Connelly and Zheng, 2007). 
In contrast high-rank workers gained on average as much as 91 percent and they were followed 
                                                           
14 The only exception is a positive coefficient for the self-employment state. However, we also note that in the models estimated for 1995, 
reported in the Appendix, the corresponding is not the case.   
 
15 These results are consistent with findings reported by Zhou and Hou (1999) who report that a “sent down” experience negatively 
affected personal income among females in 1993 (but not in earlier years investigated).   
 
  11by middle-rank workers whose average income increased by 71 percent. The increases for 
low-rank workers and workers in the not-covered sector were somewhat lower. 
 
Does the same picture emerge if studying household income per person rather than personal 
income? When moving  from individuals to households in the analysis, we also consider how 
households are composed with respect to labour market segment. In a hypothetical situation all 
gains in personal income for high-rank persons could be diluted if such persons were sharing 
the incomes with the increased number of non-workers (students, housewives). However, Table 
A1 shows that this is not a good first approximation of the real situation. The table also shows 
that changes in average disposable income per capita across categories are smaller than the 
changes in personal incomes. The same table also shows the large importance of other 
household members’ personal income for the development of living standard of non-workers. 
Although average personal income for non-workers decreased from 1995 to 2002 (Table 4), 
average disposable household income per capita increased (but by a considerably lower 
percentage than for the entire group under study).   
 
We have thus found indicators of high-rank workers belonging to the winners and the growing 
number of non-workers to the losers, as the numbers could mean that the gaps in remuneration 
between non-ranked workers on one hand and high- and middle-ranked workers on the other 
have increased. However, the results could be given another interpretation. During the period 
studied, several in-kind benefits received by workers were phased out. This change was 
probably to a larger disadvantage for high- and middle-ranked workers, and the increased 
monetary compensation might compensate, to a lower or higher degree for benefits no longer 
received. If the only reason for the increased gap in personal income between workers of 
different categories is changes in the form of remuneration, we would not expect to find 
increased gaps between the categories in other economic spheres. However, increased 
disparities across labour market categories are shown in our data. In the appendix we present 
statistical information showing increased gaps from 1995 to 2002 in terms of household wealth 
per capita as well as in housing space per capita.   
 
/Table 5 about here/   
 
Table 5 reports income inequality in personal income measured by the Gini coefficient and the 
Mean Logarithmic Deviation index for the entire group studied as well as for each category for 
  121995 and 2002. The latter has the useful property that inequality can be expressed as the 
weighted sum of the inequality within each population subgroup plus the inequality between 
subgroups (the inequality arising from if no inequality existed within each group).
 16  S e v e r a l  
observations can be made. First, income inequality in the studied group as a whole has definitly 
increased. For example, the Gini rose from 0.322 to 0.449, a rather rapid increase. Second, 
income inequality within the categories self-employed and non-workers is the largest while the 
opposite is the case for high-rank workers and middle-rank workers. Third, although income 
inequality has increased within the categories high rank, middle rank and non-workers, 
differences in means have grown even faster, and polarization has increased. This is shown as 
the proportion of total income inequality (measured by the MLD index) that can be attributed to 
differences in mean income across the seven categories has almost doubled, from 12 percent in 
1995 to 20 percent in 2002.  In other words, a person’s labour market category more strongly 
predicts the level of personal income in 2002 than in 1995.   
 
While there were thus large impulses towards increased income inequality coming from the 
labour market, it is rather interesting to see that at the household level they have been totally 
dampened.  Appendix 1 shows that while the Gini in personal income went up, the Gini for 
household income per capita moved down from 0.332 to 0.317. The same table also shows that 
inequality in household wealth per capita and also in housing space decreased from 1995 to 
2002. At the household level, and for a measure that is most relevant for welfare assessments, 
there is thus no sign of increased inequality in urban China for the period 1995 to 2002. The 
reason for this warrants a study of its own.         
 
To better understand how status as high rank and middle rank affect personal income and how 
various factors affect income among high-rank and middle-rank workers, we have conducted 
two different analyses both concentrating on the income determination among all workers.
17 In 
Table 6 we report results from regression analyses using three specifications for each year and 
log income as the dependent variable. The first includes as explanatory variables education and 
age, dummies for being sent down and ethnic status, and three dummies for combinations of 
gender and marital status. The specification also includes as control variables, one continuous 
variable indicating employment rate in the city as well as another continuous variable 
                                                           
16 For a definition of the indices see for example Sen (1997 p 31 and 140). 
17 We exclude non-workers from the dataset analyzed as other processes determine their personal income and the focus of the paper is on 
people who work. 
  13measuring average per capita income in the city. In the second specification we add as 
explanatory variable a dummy for working in the covered sector while in the third sector we 
add dummies for high rank, middle rank, self-employment and being employed (the omitted 
category is thus that of being a low-rank worker in the covered sector).     
 
/Table 6 about here/   
 
The following comments can be made: First, the coefficient of education has increased from 
1995 to 2002. This finding is consistent with what has been reported from the same data when 
estimating earnings functions and from other data analyzing the relation between education and 
earnings.
18 When adding the dummy for covered sector the coefficient is positive both years, 
and has actually increased.  In specification three we find that such changes are not uniform 
across workers in the sector. Of great interest to this paper is that the coefficients of high rank 
and middle rank are both positive and estimated with high t-statistics. They are higher in 2002 
than in 1995. The coefficient for high rank increased from 0.13 in 1995 to 0.30 in 2002 while 
the coefficient for middle rank went from 0.11 to 0.19.
19 Thus rank seems to have an 
independent  and  increasing  effect  on  personal  income.       
 
Comparing coefficient for education in specifications one and two we find them to be almost 
odemtoal. When moving to specification three, the coefficient for education is lowered, but only 
slightly. The indirect effect of education on personal income via sector is very small and the one 
channeled via rank status is not particularly high. In contrast, the results indicate that the payoff 
from being employed in the covered sector for a low-rank worker (compared to working in the 
non-covered sector) decreased across years to become rather small. Finally, the dummy for 
self-employed in specification 3 went from positive and significant in 1995 to being 
insignificant in 2002.     
 
In Table 6 we report relatively large coefficients for the dummy married male (not-married 
male as the omitted category) and they are estimated with high t-statistics. In contrast, 
coefficients for not-married female and married female are both small and many estimated with 
low t-statistics. The coefficients for party membership are all positive and estimated with high 
t-values. The estimates also indicate that, not surprisingly, average city income has a positive 
                                                           
18 For the former see for example Knight and Song (2008) and for the latter see Zhang et al. (2005).   
19 Our estimates for 1995 are similar to those for 1993 reported by Zhou (2004) using a similar specification.   
  14effect on personal income. There are no indications of ethnic minority status or being sent down 
to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution affecting personal income. 
 
/Table  7  about  here  /       
 
In the second exercise we also analyze all workers but disaggregate the samples for 1995 and 
2002 by the five labor market segments of workers and estimate the same specification for each. 
This we do in order to better understand income determination within categories, and to 
investigate possible changes over time. The following comments can be made: Coefficients of 
education are all positive, with only one exception (self-employed 1995) estimated with 
t-values higher than 2. They tend to be higher in 2002 than in 1995.
20  In all categories, with 
the exception of self-employed, the positive coefficient of party membership as well as age, and 
the negative of age squared are estimated with high t-values. The coefficient for female gender 
are all negative, and with only one exception (middle-rank females in 2002), estimated with 
high t-statistics. The highest negative effect is found among the self-employed. Thus, not 
surprisingly, the process of income determination among self-employed seems to differ in many 
respects from that of wage earners.   
 
 
7. Conclusions   
 
In this paper we have claimed that greater attention should be paid to the ranking system when 
trying to understand the Chinese labour market and its changes. Although larger proportions of 
people of working age than previously are not covered by the ranking system, in 2002 around 3 
percent of persons of working age belonged to the high rank category as defined here and 
another 14 percent belonged to the middle rank category. These proportions are actually similar 
to those calculated for 1995. Using microdata from surveys covering large parts of urban China, 
we have investigated factors essential for belonging to each of the previously mentioned 
categories as well as to four other categories, by estimating a multinomial probit model. We 
have also investigated how personal income, disposable per capita income (averages and 
inequality), household wealth per capita and housing space per capita changed from 1995 to 
2002 for the six categories. Further we studied the income generation process by estimating 
                                                           
20 In Table 7 the coefficient for education is higher among non-covered workers than among high rank-worker, middle-rank worker and 
low-rank worker.   
  15regression  models.         
 
Not surprisingly, we have confirmed that presence of a long education and relatively high age 
make it more likely for a person to have a high or middle rank than a low rank. China’s 
high-rank workers compose a men’s club, to a large extent, as in 2002 there were four males for 
every female. We have reported that there is relatively little inequality in personal income 
among persons of high and middle rank, though it is increasing. A main conclusion is that the 
old elite of workers of high rank have not only succeeded in keeping their money income 
position, they have actually experienced increases in relation to other persons of work-active 
ages. Workers of high rank, and to a lesser degree of middle rank, are the winners. This 
judgment is based on the analysis of personal income, disposable income per capita, household 
income per capita and housing space per capita. During the period 1995 to 2002, the losers are 
the increasingly large group of non-workers.   
 
In 2002, the distribution of personal income in urban China among people of work-active ages 
was more polarized than in 1995, based on the categories used here. During this period, the 
rates of return to education increased. However, the regression analysis reported here indicates 
that this is far from a full explanation for why workers of high rank, and to some extent  
middle rank,    have fared as well as they have. Our analysis indicates that gender differences in 
urban China consist of lesser probability for women having high-rank jobs, and of lower 
payoffs for characteristics within the segment where women work. Finally, our study has 
illustrated that a strong impulse towards more inequality arising from the labor market was 
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1995  631  4.16 2394  15.78  5723  37.72  187  1.23 5437  35.83 802  5.29 1517
4 
100% 
                       
2002  504  3.34  1975  13.11 2347  15.58 468  3.11  5511  36.57      4264  28.30 1506
9 
100% 
Note: High rank includes those who are at senior professional level and senior cadre level (Chuzhang and above); middle rank includes middle rank of professional and 
cadre (Kezhang); Other wage earners in same sectors   
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Workers in not 
covered  sector    
Non- 
worker  
1995            
Average education. Years    13.93  12.41  9.78  9.15  10.27  8.36 
Average age. Years  49.92  44.13  38.48  38.36  34.05  44.87 
Average per capita city income (Yuan)  5414  5073  4854  4636  4966  5520 
Average city employment rate (percent)    80.68  81.45  81.21  79.60  81.31  80.25 
Percentage Males    74.48  58.65  50.50  50.27  43.20  28.55 
Percentage Females    25.52  41.35  49.50  49.73  56.80  71.45 
Sent down during the Cultural 
Revolution. Percent.   
11.89 22.60  20.32  10.16  15.85  7.86 
Member of CPC. Percent.      66.09  49.75  16.16  9.09  12.45  10.22 
Number of observations  361  2391  5688  186  4123  802 
2002            
Average individual total income (Yuan)  20099  15461  10625  10474  11042  2634 
Average education, Years    14.05  13.30  10.46  9.45  10.96  9.9 
Average age. Years.      47.12  42.48  40.46  39.80  40.42  36.94 
Average city per capita    income 
(Yuan) 
7973 7724  8034  7515  8108  7863 
Average city employment rate    68.20  69.54  68.56  69.09  68.73  66.80 
Percent of urban born    67.06  69.87  82.45  77.14  78.73  82.90 
Percentage Male    80.95  63.54  58.24  57.48  46.80  35.13 
Percentage Female    19.05  36.46  41.76  42.52  53.20  64.87 
Sent down during the Cultural 
Revolution. Percent 
21.23 18.33  20.07  12.82  16.62  11.61 
Member of CPC. Percent.  68.25  53.92  19.09  8.55  23.04  9.64 
Percentage of at least one parent having 
high education   
46.83 50.58  38.73  37.82  37.91  29.81 
Percentage of at least one parent being 
professional or cadre     
41.25 38.66  28.52  24.73  27.47  21.58 
Percentage of parents working in same 
units but not professional or cadre. 
30.99 35.25  51.93  36.11  46.04  47.94 
Percentage of parents self- employed or 
private owner. 
1.21 1.35  1.73  3.94  2.11  2.66 
Percentage parents working in 
non-covered sector   
26.56 24.74  17.82  35.23  24.38  27.82 
Number of observations  504  1975  2346  468  5503  4264 
Note: Income variables are expressed in prices of 2002 (by CPI). 
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worker  Non-worker 
  Coef.  Z- 
value  Coef.  Z- 
value  Coef.  Z- 
value  Coef.  Z- 
value  Coef.  Z- 




0.0108   18.31  0.0308   32.56  -0.0113  -11.19  -0.0046  -9.52  -0.0010   -0.73  -0.0247  -24.04 
Age  0.0144    6.62 0.0344   12.89  0.0288  13.17 0.0081  6.8 0.0120    4.51  -0.0976 -74.13 
Age square  -0.0001    -5.86 -0.0004   -12.38  -0.0004  -14.34 -0.0001  -7.25 -0.0002    -5.51  0.0012  69.85 
Party 
member 
0.0208   5.54  0.0779   11.26  -0.0156  -2.15  -0.0209  -9.13  0.0319   3.16  -0.0941  -12.56 
Employment 
rate of the 
residential 
city 




0.0000    2.5 0.0000    -3.8  0.0000  4.12 0.0000  -5.03 0.0000    1.84 0.0000  -1.88 
Send down  -0.0041    -1.26 -0.0049    -0.75  0.0262  2.98 -0.0062  -1.66 -0.0155    -1.43  0.0045  0.5 
Minority  -0.0032   -0.45 0.0049    0.37  -0.0273  -1.91 0.0374  3.34 0.0067    0.33  -0.0184  -1.21 
Male   0.0269   6.69  0.0352   6.17  0.0755  10.97  0.0184  5.13  -0.0185   -2.38  -0.1375  -27.22 













-0.0085   -0.89  -0.0312   -1.86  -0.0179  -0.89  0.0228  1.09  0.0168   0.62  0.0180  0.87 
Parents are 
non-worker 
-0.0032   -0.45  -0.0139   -1.04  -0.0418  -3.1  0.0089  -18.03  0.0375   1.9  0.0123  0.85 
Observations  504   1975   2346    468    5503    4264   














Other wage earners 
in same sectors   
Self-employed or 
private owner 





1995             
Total China  10508  9011  6584  7570  6780  3444  7073 
2002             
Total China  20099  15461  10625  10474  11042  2634  9461.70 
Percentage 
change  
+91 +72  +61  +38.  +63  -24 +34 
Source: Authors calculation from CHIP, urban survey.     
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Table 5 Income inequality among various labor market categories 1995 and 2002 
 
 
  MLD  MLD  Gini   Gini  
Decomposition of individual total income  1995   2002   1995  2002 
Total urban China      0.1901  0.3707  0.3223  0.4486 
Within all groups  0.1687  0.2232     
Among: high rank individuals    0.0906 0.1312 0.2329 0.2742 
       Middle  rank  individuals   0.1315  0.1466  0.2544  0.2836 
       Other  wage  earners  in  same  units  0.1633  0.1591  0.3011  0.3068 
       Self-employed  or  private  owner  0.3155  0.3146  0.4208  0.4112 
       Not  covered  employed  workers   0.2009  0.1924  0.3318  0.3341 
       Non-worker   0.3186  0.7825  0.4217  0.6334 
Between different groups  0.0174  0.1476     
Between different groups as percent of total index    9.15  39.82     
Number of observations  15174  15069    
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Table 6 Income functions 1995 and 2002.    
 
  1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 
 Coefficient 




















( 20.12)  
0.0480 
(22.83) 
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2 0.3769  0.295  0.38 0.3023 0.3835    0.3102 
Number of 
observations  
13019 10768  13019 10768 13019 10768 
        
Note: Dependent variable is log personal income. The omitted category is work in same sectors. The analysis is restricted to 
workers. 












Table 7 Income functions for different labor market categories 1995 and 2002 
 






Self-employed Not  covered 
worker  
1995  Coefficient,  t 
statistics value 
Coefficient,  t 
statistics value 
Coefficient,  t 
statistics value 
Coefficient,  t 
statistics value 
Coefficient,  t 
statistics value 
































































































Adjusted  R2  0.3487 0.3221 0.3217 0.2203 0.3555 
Number of 
observations   631 2391  5688 186 4123 
2002       
































































































Adjusted  R2  0.2648 0.2405 0.2398 0.1783 0.2666 
Number of 
observations   504 1968  2336 463 5497 
 






Table A 1 Household income, wealth and house square meters per capita among various labor 
market categories 1995 and 2002. Yuan (as in 2002).   
 
 
  1995  2002  
Household Disposable Income Per Capita    Mean value  Gini    Mean value  Gini   
Increase. Percentage 
High rank  8945  0.29  16185  0.2997  80.94 
Middle rank  7591  0.3199  12587  0.29  65.81 
Low rank  6030  0.3123  9621  0.2891  59.55 
Self-employed and private owners  5891  0.4469  8703  0.3531  47.73 
Wage earners elsewhere  6053  0.3381  10580  0.3164  74.79 
Non-worker 6596  0.3344  8433  0.3107  27.85 
Total   6301  0.332  10010  0.3169  58.86 
Household Wealth Per Capita             
High  rank  17243 0.5062 80589 0.4261  367.37 
Middle  rank  16429 0.4996 55750 0.4214  239.33 
Low  rank  12790 0.4962 43091 0.4496  236.91 
Self-employed and private owners  17329  0.5246  48772  0.5388  181.45 
Wage  earners  elsewhere  13251 0.5242 48229 0.4932  263.96 
Non-worker  16991 0.5921 40845 0.4743  140.39 
Total    13698 0.5181 46134 0.4751  236.79 
Housing space. Square meters per capita           
High  rank  17.49 0.2744 21.67 0.2474  23.90 
Middle  rank  16.53 0.2664 19.83 0.2509  19.96 
Low  rank  14.71 0.2645 15.64 0.2548  6.32 
Self-employed and private owners  15.62  0.2601  19.02  0.3089  21.77 
Wage  earners  elsewhere  14.75 0.2659 17.67 0.2708  19.80 
Non-worker 16.34  0.3044  16.55  0.264  1.29 
Total    15.27 0.2733 17.58 0.2698  15.13 
Source: Authors calculation from CHIP, urban survey. 
Note: Data of 1995 have been adjusted with CPI 
Household disposable income consists of the sum of household member’s personal income, plus household (but not individual 
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Table A2 Determinants of different labor market categories 1995 and 2002.   
 
  High  rank   Middle  rank   Low  rank   Self  employed  or 
private owner 
Else wage 
earners   
Non 
worker  
  Coefficient 
and z-value 
Coefficient 
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Employment rate of 

































































       
Number of 
observations   631 2394  5723  187  5437  802 
2002         
















































Employment rate of 

































































       
Number of 
observations  
504  1975 2347 468  5511 4264 
Note: the omitted category is low rank.     
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